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SUCCESS, SORROW AND THE SNP
Since the end of last century, there have been waves of support for
Scottish home rule. In the 1880s, the first Scottish Home Rule Association was
founded largely following the Irish example. Its members were overwhelmingly
Liberals. It was well supported in Scotland, but the course of world events
overtook it. After the First World War, the Labour Party quickly took over the
second position in British politics and a new Scottish Home Rule Association
expressed the strong interest in Scottish autonomy (1). According to the
Authorized Version, that war had been fought for the rights of small nations,
and many Scots assumed that they qualified. Economic events this time came
in the way of success, and British, including Scottish, politics became class
politics. Many members of the Association were, however, outraged by the
lack of interest of the Labour leaders. They split off and formed the National
Party of Scotland (1928); later the modern Scottish National Party (1934) (2).
Until the early sixties, this organization was a tiny fringe body which
had some impressive leaders, but it was rather different from the earlier
associations. These latter had worked for Scottish "autonomy" in which a
Scottish government would look after Scottish domestic affairs, and defence
and foreign affairs would be handled in London. The SNP, from the beginning,
sought a Scotland which was completely independent.
It was largely this policy which condemned the SNP to the sidelines.
In Ireland nation and class struggled to be the basic cleavage in the politics of
the country and nation won hands down. In Scotland class virtually obliterated
any concern with the nation. In the early sixties, however, with virtually no
warning, Nationalist candidates began to get more and more votes. By the
1970 General Election, the major parties in Scotland realized that they had a
new competitor and, as Table 1 shows, at the General Election in October
1974, they co1lected thirty per cent of the vote, won eleven of the seventy two
Scottish seats, came second to Labour (the dominant Scottish party) in thirty
six of their forty one seats and they did not loose any deposits. Their success
terrorized the Labour government into rediscovering their ancient commitment
to Home Rule and introducing legislation for it; one of the two most important
policies of this Parliament. It was lost, largely because Labour MPs were not
prepared to unite to let it through, and their own Government fell.
The effect on Scotland and the SNP was very dramatic. At the
resulting General Election, the Nacionalists crashed to seventeen per cent of
the Scottish vote, lost nine of their MPs and were in total, snarling,
self-destructive disarray.
Table1
MOVEMENT TO PARTY
This paper is concerned with what happened within the SNP after
this disaster. My argument is that there has been an important change taking
the organization from a movement to a modern type of party, with the result
that there will be quite serious changes in which the Nationalists will operate.
There have been three major internal debates which I shall state here and
then explore in the next three sections.
The most striking change is that the SNP is now a party with left-wing
policies, often more radical than those of the Labour Party. Up to the late
sixties the orthodoxy within the party had been that the SNP was neither a
party of the right or the left but was a party for Scotland. As such, it ought to
have no policy other than Independence, for that policy alone could solve
Scotland's problems. Since 1979 there has been a vigorous debate resulting in
the unwilling acceptance of a need to target Scottish working-class voters and
this meant adopting policies which would attract them.
The second major debate has been over whether the party should
pursue a gradual road to independence or whether they should accept no
compromises and cooperate with other bodies only in the cause of complete
independence.
The final debate revolved around whether, having got rid of English
domination, Scotland should pursue a path wholly on her own or whether she
should seek to enter the European Community since this would act as a
counterfoil to the English connection.
ADOPTING THE SCOTTISH WORKING CLASS
First of all, why has the SNP moved to the left and what is the
significance of this for the future of the party?
In an outstanding study of European politics, Angelo Panebianco
stresses the importance of the genetic imprint in the development of parties
(3). In the case of the SNP, one part of the genesis was that the movement
was set up largely by people who had been in the Labour Party in Scotland. I
have referred to this when I discussed the Scottish Home Rule Association.
The organization is heavily influenced by the arrangements of the Labour
Party and the early publications show a concern for employment and housing
of the Scottish working class. One cannot, then, say there was no precedent
for placing the SNP on the left of British politics. On the other hand there were
no links between the party and the working class movement. On the contrary,
perhaps more in Scotland than in any other part of the United Kingdom, the
Scottish working class was unionized and thus firmly associated with the
Labour Party; with the exception of the strongly Protestant working class in the
west of Scotland which was Conservative as a result of anti-Catholic feeling
and hatred of Irish Catholics (4). Neither group was likely to support the SNP.
Thus the sympathy of the early SNP for the plight of the working class was
really middle-class sympathy for a group with which they had no close ties.
Within a few years generation which had founded the SNP moved-on
and their successor, after 1945, faced a Labour government which was every
bit as hostile to Scottish autonomy as the Conservatives had ever been.
Under these circumstances, the ruling approach in the tiny SNP was
that theirs was a party of the whole of Scotland. Class politics was irrelevant to
a society which was being exploited, not just by capitalists, but by English
capitalists to whom the English working class seemed to lend willing hands.
After independence it would be up to the people of Scotland to decide whether
the country was to be Socialist or Conservative or Liberal or anything else.
The Scottish National Party had nothing to do with this and many of its
members doubted whether the party would even survive once the country
regained its freedom.
To understand this period properly, one must remember that the
SNP was a tiny party at the fringes of Scottish politics. In 1960 it had two
branches in the whole of the country and probably under one hundred
members. It was as much as they could do to keep alive the idea of
nationalism.
To a large extent, the change in the fortunes of the SNP owed a
great deal to the fall in support suffered by both the main British parties (5).
From 1961 onwards the economy showed clear signs of going wrong and no
one seemed able to handle it. Even the new Labour government in 1964, with
a strong commitment to bring down unemployment through its trade union
connections, was impotent. Large numbers of people who had always voted
for these big parties ceased to turn out for them; some went to the Liberals or
even the National Front and a large percentage started to vote for the SNP (6).
That must be part of the explanation of the rise in the vote for the Nationalists,
but it is not the only one. They could, for example, have voted Liberal
especially since that party still held more seats proportionately in Scotland
than in Great Britain as a whole. Somewhat less imaginable is that they might
have voted Communist. In fact, since the ethnic cleavage was second only to
the class cleavage in Scotland, it is not surprising that, when neither of the
class parties in Scotland seemed able to deliver more economic security, to
their voters, the SNP should be the second choice.
The Nationalists were, however, the choice of constituencies on the
peripheries of Scotland. Despite their early successes in the Central Industrial
Belt seats of Hamilton and Govan: both won at by-elections from Labour: their
wins in 1974 hardly touched the largely working class seats in any of the major
southern industrial towns (7).
Despite the fact that Labour suffered a cataclysm in the 1979
election in Britain as a whole, this was the first election where it became clear
that the voting patterns in Scotland, and to some extent in the North of
England, were rather different from those in England as a whole. The Labour
Party emerged as the hegemonic party in Scotland and has retained this
position ever since. Despite the Conservatives' dominance of this and all
subsequent elections in Britain, they consistently lost ground in Scotland.
Since the 1987 Election, the Conservatives have not even been able to elect
sufficient Scottish MPs to staff the major Scottish parliamentary committees.
Given that last development, three strategies were open to the SNP.
They could have decided to appeal to the Scottish people as a whole without
regard to class or other divisions. To a large extent, they do this, as they have
always done, but the two other options imply important changes of emphasis.
They could appeal to Scottish middle-class voters and especially to
Conservatives. Since there are only ten seats now out of the seventy two who
return Conservatives in Scotland, this would not do much to attain the target
majority among Scottish seats. Much more attractive is the final strategy which
is to appeal as champions of the working class and thus steal Labour voters.
They are a much larger proportion of the Scottish electorate and a more
glittering prize.
There are other reasons for recommending the left strategy. Among
the general economic decline of Britain since the war, the older industrial
areas have done worst of all. Scotland has particular problems because
virtually all its economy was based on the heavy engineering of the South
West: on shipbuilding and other steel based industry (8). Today there is only
one large shipyard on the Clyde (run by Norwegians) and only one (heavily
threatened) steel mill. Thus, as the table shows, there have been massive
numbers of industrial closures in Scotland and unemployment is much higher
than the British average. If the SNP going to arrest the process of industrial
decline, it must rethink a new manufacturing strategy. With so many on
unemployment benefit and other forms of state aid, and with so many others
employed in various public sector jobs, both compassion and common sense
seem to point the SNP in a leftward direction.
Table2
There is another reason for a move to the left. During the hundred
years when Scottish home rule has been an issue, among its fiercest
opponents have been the Scottish business class. They have always feared
that English markets might be closed to them and they have not felt confident
that they could compete on equal terms with other areas either in Britain or
elsewhere. Many indicators of their skills suggest that they are right to be
afraid. In fact the situation is more serious than that: One of the striking
features of Catalan nationalism, as I understand it, is that it was supported by
virtually all the Catalan elites including the business elite. The reverse of this
has been true in Scotland. The Church of Scotland was given a privileged
position in the Act of Union (1707). So also were the lawyers who operated the
Scottish system completely differently from the legal system in England and
Wales. The local government system was also given a protected position and
the same could be said of other Scottish elites such as those running the
Universities and the major cultural institutions in the world of art, music and, to
a lesser extent, theatre. The effect of all this was to make these institutions
staunch supporters of the Union. In the case of the educational and cultural
institutions, this was compounded even more by the fact that the heads of the
vast majority of them are English (9).
With all there considerations, it might seem apparent that the SNP
should turn to the left. It was not.
The debate on the proposal that the SNP should move left was
heavily influenced by the internal dynamics of the organization. In the first
place, although it had been growing since 1962, the party was still dominated
by a small group of people who had run it, in some cases, since before the
war. Robert MacIntyre had been the first successful SNP parliamentary
candidate in 1945. Arthur Donaldson had been a national office-bearer before
the War. There were several others less prominent, but who still had control of
the machine. Although several of them had been socialists in their youth, that
was a long time ago and for them the Labour Party was the enemy. Labour
reciprocated this feeling. The experience of keeping the party going at a time
when a great many of their fellow Scots probably thought they were a little
mad, seemed to have steeled their resolve to keep the party as it was. The
certainly did not want to loose control just at the point when the party had
become an established part of Scottish politics. A more important feature of
the personal histories of this old guard was that they came from a time when
Scottish nationalism was more of a cultural movement. All the talk of saving
steel works or shipyards was important for them, but not of the first
importance.
One relevant question is why these old men and women still retained
their positions in the party. one quick answer is that MacIntyre and Donaldson,
at least, were skilled and devious operators. The other is that many of the new
members who came into the party in the 1960s and 1970s respected them for
having kept the movement together through the bad times. Thirdly, many of
these younger members came into the party for a short time, but there was a
very considerable turn-over. Often they went off to work in other organizations
such as the anti-nuclear movement or the poverty lobby while the old guard
stayed on as they had done for many years. Finally, and perhaps most
important, most of the new members were non-political in the sense that they
had not been deeply interested in politics before: certainly not to the extent of
joining a political party. They did not have clear political views other than a
feeling of Scottishness and the conviction that the English were doing better
than they were (which they were). As such, the simplistic, non-political views
of the old guard appealed to them. They younger generation who pressed the
party to work out policies sounded too like the Labour and Conservative
politicians with whom they had just dispensed.
In the acrid debate about what had gone wrong in the 1979 elections
this old guard and the majority of the party members who agreed with them
formed one side of the argument. The other was taken up by a group of young
Nationalists, most of them in their twenties, who were opposed to the "non-
political" approach of their elders (10).
The 79 Group was set up on three principles. It was Nationalist,
Socialist and Republican. Nobody quarreled with the first basis of the group. In
support of the second basis, the Group argued, as I have already described,
that the natural base for the Nationalist vote was the working class. Several
polls had shown that the SNP was the second choice of the majority of Labour
voters, where this was not true of other voters (11). In any case, if one were to
attract Labour voters to the SNP: the only hope of victory: the SNP had to
become the workers' party and socialism was the ideology of a workers' party.
Finally, the Group argued that there was no place for the Monarchy in a
modern Scotland. It was a prop for the class system and a justification for
snobbery. Nothing could be more alien to the life of a Glasgow housing estate
than the Queen and all the apparatus of Royalty. If the SNP were to become a
modern party, it had to be done with all of that.
The most important reaction to the foundation of the 79 Group was
that this was factionalism. Although there had been disagreements about
policy in the past ten years, no faction had been formed. The SNP stood for a
united Scottish effort to gain freedom and could find no place for organized
internal opposition groups, trying to take over the party for their own ends.
There was another way of interpreting the reactions of the SNP
establishment to the 79 Group. They represented a new generation
introducing the ideas of the 1970s, disrespectful of the elders and eager to
occupy the leading positions in the party. Basically it was a clash of
generations.
I have discussed the establishment and the banning of the 79 Group
in an earlier article (12). It is significant that the seven members who were
expelled from the Party for their refusal to abandon the principles of the 79
Group were readmitted to the Party after a period of only six months only.
Much more important was the official acceptance by the party of the left-wing
tactic. To crown this, most of the leading positions in the party, by the late
eighties were in the hands of the left wing. Why had this turn-around taken
place. The party which once expelled the apostles of socialism, now elected
them as their leaders. Why had this happened?
The first reason was simply the passing of time. By the mid-Eighties,
the Old Guard were very old and, in many cases, beyond even the honorific
positions. Although there were many "non-politicals" who shared the anti-
factional views of the old guard, there was no one of a sufficient status to
occupy their position.
The second and m ore obvious reason was that the policies of Mrs.
Thatcher's Conservative Government had particularly bad effects on Scotland.
As regional aid was cut off, even the surviving heavy industries began to close
down. In the huge working class housing estates, the cuts in welfare benefits
created more poverty with fewer and fewer ways out. Under these
circumstances it was difficult for the SNP to take anything other than an
anti-Conservative stance. This might not be socialist in the terms of Karl Marx,
but it certainly meant that the Nationalists could not but identify with the
Scottish working class if they wanted to appear to be against the government.
Finally, the Conservative government ushered in a period of prosperity
for the South of England which self-evidently was not shared by Scotland. For
the effort of turning on their television sets, Scottish people could see how well
the southern English working class were doing. They could look around them
and see how badly they were doing in comparison. To make matters worse,
the symbol of that Conservative revolution was an English woman with a
peculiar forced southern English accent who seemed totally alien to the needs
of a Glasgow high-rise or a croft on Barra.
My contention has been that the development of British politics made
it almost inevitable that the SNP should move to the left. Just to drive the point
home, the thrust of SNP policies became the thrust of the 79 Group argument.
Their main concern were the protection of Scottish jobs.
The evidence for this statement is easy to produce. The 79 Group
had backed up its advocacy of socialist policies with campaigning to save jobs
in firms which were scheduled to close. Perhaps their most famous action was
in support of the women workers in the Lee Jeans factory in Greenock. In the
years after the Group was dissolved many more factories and works were shut
down of which the most important was probably the huge steel strip mill at
Gartcosh and the threat to the even larger works at Ravenscraig. For a
country with its industrial past and its myths built upon heavy industry, the
protection of these steel works had a special place. In the years since the 79
Group was closed down and then its leaders readmitted, there have been
many of these campaigns. The closures of virtually all the many large factories
in Scotland have been accompanied by demonstrations and delegations led
by the SNP: not just by the leaders of the deceased SNP faction, but by the
Chairman and other major figures in the party who fought vigorously against
the Group. To make the point even more forcefully, during the long and bitter
miners' strike, support from the Labour Party flagged when it became clear
that the leader of the union: Arthur Scargill was a fierce left-wing critic of the
Labour leadership. By the midpoint of the strike, it could not be said that
Labour enthusiastically supported the strike party pressure was exercised on
the miners to accept the settlement (13). By contrast, the SNP declared its
support for the miners right from the start and never wavered.
To close this section it is important to say that the left policies of the
SNP were not confined to questions of industry and industrial relations. The
SNP was and is a party which supports unilateral nuclear disarmament: a
policy only adopted by the Labour Party for two years periods in the early
sixties and the early eighties. The SNP has never wavered. It is also opposed
to the peaceful use of nuclear power and certainly to nuclear dumping.
SCOTLAND AND EUROPE
The two other policy changes in the SNP can be dealt with more
quickly. First, the party was completely against entry to the European
Common Market when the matter was debated in the sixties and seventies.
Scotland should not exchange the tyranny of London for that of Brussels.
The movement to the new policy occurred when Jim Sillars, lately a
left-wing Labour MP, joined the SNP. He instantly became an idol of the 79
Group. Despite the fact that the Labour left had in general been anti-Market,
Sillars supported it and he brought this enthusiasm to his new party. If we look
at the sides in the battle within the SNP over this policy we find that the
opponents were the old guard within the party: even the old left such as Jim
Fairlie. The Marketers were almost exclusively 79 Group members and
generally those of the young (20s and 30s) generation. They looked
realistically at the economy of Scotland and decided that Scotland needed
Europe if it were to become a modern nation state. Only in the EEC was there
a convenient and large market. Only in Europe could Scotland cooperate with
other states of similar size and shake off the dominance of England in the
same way as Ireland had.
By 1984, the policy of the left, Scotland within Europe had become
the policy of the party.
INDEPENDENCE NOTHING LESS
When the Referendum on a Scottish parliament was lost according
to the forty per cent hurdle, the SNP smelt immediate betrayal. It was
predictable that they should vow to have nothing more to do with other parties
such as Labour and the Liberals who claimed to fight for Scottish Home Rule,
but always found reasons for not delivering.
Despite the fact that many Nationalists supported the all-party
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly founded after the Referendum, the official
policy of the party was completely opposed. Once again the hands of the old
isolationist Nationalists is visible. Within the 79 Group there was a recognition
that Independence was not going to be won at a single swoop. The majority of
Scottish people were not ready to support it and the legislative campaign need
the support of the other parties. It was significant that the founder and
Chairman of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly was also a founder
member of the 79 Group and he worked closely with other members of the
Group such as its chairman: Stephen Maxwell. The refusal of the Party to
accept this line was initially an indication of the power of the old isolationist
Nationalists. It was equally significant that the Chairman of the Party: Gordon
Wilson: who was not from the left: soon launched a plan for a Scottish
Convention which was in many ways identical with the tactic of accepting
home rule first in cooperation with other groups in Scotland. The implicit aim
was that this would be a step on the way to complete independence.
Wilson's plan was not approved by the Party. Even as the old guard
faded out, the rank and file of the SNP still felt enormous bitterness about the
betrayal by Labour over the Referendum. More significant than this, Sillars and
the left: which now dominates the leadership of the Party: also refuse to
cooperate with Labour and the other groups which have set up their own
version of a Constitutional Convention. The cause of this stance is that the
Labour Party has indeed captured the Convention. The SNP was refused the
proportion of delegates which it thought was its due and in general the SNP
leaders: the left and the others: suspected that to cooperate with the
Convention was simply to connive in building a vehicle which was really meant
to attract even more Scottish voters to Labour. In private, the new leaders of
the SNP are well aware that home rule in Scotland can only be won by
cooperation.
THE BOTTOM LINE
The Scottish National Party has moved very quickly to the left in the
last ten years. In addition, it has renewed its leadership leaving very few of the
old guard in post. I believe that what has been experienced is a change from
the old "movement" type of organization where winning elections and power
were less important than keeping pure certain principles, to a modern type of
party willing to think in terms of strategy and tactics to attain power. As a
long-surviving part of the Scottish political landscape with an established and
experienced leadership, it is likely to fight in Scotland for many years to come.
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